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Abstract – A coevolution model by coupling mortality and fertility selection is introduced to
investigate the evolution of cooperation and network structure in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The cooperation level goes through a continuous phase transition vs. defection temptation b for
low mortality selection intensity β and through a discontinuous one for infinite β. The cooperation
level is enhanced most at β ≈ 1 for any b. The local and global properties of the network structure,
such as cluster and cooperating k-core, are investigated for the understanding of cooperation
evolution. Cooperation is promoted by forming a tight cooperating k-core at moderate β, but too
large β will destroy the cooperating k-core rapidly resulting in a rapid drop of the cooperation
level. Importantly, the infinite β changes the normalized sucker’s payoff S from 0 to 1− b and
its dynamics of the cooperation level undergoes a very slow power-law decay, which leads the
evolution into the regime of neutral evolution.
Copyright c© EPLA, 2011
Introduction. – Evolutionary game theory [1–4], first
introduced by Maynard Smith, has proved to be a compe-
tent tool in studying the evolution of altruistic behavior
under natural selection, due to the fundamental descrip-
tion of frequency-dependent selection. For unrelated indi-
viduals, the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) [5,6] has become
the general metaphor. This game carries out a pairwise
interaction between two players each deciding simulta-
neously to cooperate or to defect. Mutual cooperation
and defection will offer both reward R and punishment
P , respectively. Otherwise, the cooperator will get the
sucker’s payoff S facing a defector who gets temptation
T instead. In PD game, the payoffs are arranged as T >
R>P >S and 2R>T +S. It immediately follows that
it is always better to defect regardless of the opponent’s
decision and the dilemma lies in that mutual coopera-
tion gives higher cumulative payoffs than mutual defection
does.
Early pioneering numerical work was implemented with
imitation dynamics of the PD game in two-dimensional
square lattices [7]. Each individual would play PD game
with its grid neighbors, record its total score, and then
(a)E-mail: dpyang@xmu.edu.cn
copy the strategy of its highest-scoring neighbor for the
next round. In this setting, cooperators could form clusters
to resist invasion by defectors at their borders. As inspired
by the network science [8] in the last decade, the studies
of evolutionary games have shifted from on regular grid
to on complex networks, which can be considered as
a step towards more realistic conditions. Variations in
topology and strategy update mechanism have since been
extensively studied [9–12].
Recently the finite systems evolving under stochastic
death-birth Moran process [13–15], where an individual
is randomly eliminated and another individual is chosen
for reproduction proportionally to its fitness, have been
studied widely. It is reported that cooperation is viable
in this process only if the average degree (number of
neighbors) 〈k〉 of the network satisfies 〈k〉< b0/c [15] on
static networks, where a cooperator pays a cost c for its
opponent to receive a benefit b0, while a defector pays
nothing and just receives the benefit. Similar results are
also reported in refs. [16,17] on a coevolution model, where
the offspring inherits a strategy of its parent and definitely
links to its parent. However, both results are in line with
Hamilton’s rule of kin selection [16–20], that is frequent
kin interactions promote cooperation.
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A lot of works have focused on fertility selection [16–20].
However, the payoff to an individual is in terms of the
effect in fitness including survival and reproduction [6]
generally. There are only a few works [21–23] about
the effect of mortality selection on the evolution of
cooperation. For instance, iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game on a lattice-structured population has been derived
analytically and numerically in ref. [21]. On the other
hand, coevolution of individual strategies and network
structure has been studied extensively and discovered
with many insights of dynamical features and strategy
dynamics [24–31]. Under the simple coevolution rule, the
formation of cooperator groups has been recognized to
be paramount for cooperation enhancement [32–34]. Our
previous work [34] proposed a coevolution model which
was based on mortality selection without inheritance
mechanism. We showed that with a certain range of the
intensity, cooperators can self-organize to a cluster and
withstand the invasion of defectors by forming a firm
cooperating core.
In this letter, we investigate a more realistic coevolution
model with mortality selection and fertility selection to
understand their cooperativity and competition for the
evolution of cooperation. We want to know if these
two cooperation-promoting mechanisms can coexist and
reinforce cooperators’ survival ability and fertility so
as to enhance cooperation further. We show that the
coupling of them is nontrivial and can induce much more
complicated dynamics. Here, we study their cooperativity
and competition by varying the intensity of mortality
selection. We show that the cooperation level goes through
a continuous phase transition vs. defection temptation for
low mortality selection intensity, but a discontinuous one
for infinite intensity. The local and global properties of the
network structure, such as cluster and cooperating k-core,
are introduced to understand the underlying mechanism
for cooperation enhancement. Our simulation indicates
that the cooperating k-core and the cooperation level will
breakdown at large intensity, while the cooperation level
will decay in a power-law way at infinite intensity, which
implies, as an important result, that the infinite intensity
of mortality selection leads the evolution into the regime
of neutral evolution [35,36].
Coevolution model under natural selection. –
In this coevolution model, we maintain the population
size N in the stochastic death-birth process. In most
cases, the system size is set as N = 1000, except for
the conditions near the critical point, where we simulate
with N from 104 to 105. Initially, the population are
located on a random network with average degree 〈k〉=
k0 = 6 and they act as cooperators and defectors with
identical probability. At each time each individual i
gathers its payoff πi by interacting pairwise with all its
neighbors. As advised by previous works, the common
payoff matrix is set as T = b, R= 1, P = S = 0 [7]. We
simply suppose that an individual i’s fertility probability
is proportional to its payoff, while its mortality probability
is negative-exponentially proportional to its payoff as
exp(−β ∗πi) [37].
The parameter β measures the intensity of mortality
selection and can take any positive value. β = 0 means
no mortality selection and individuals have the identical
probability to be eliminated. For small β, it is weak selec-
tion and the exponential function can be approximated by
a linear function, which is also adopted by fertility selec-
tion. In this case, both mortality and fertility selections
acting on individual level can be well described by mean-
field analysis which just acts on species. For large β, an
intensive effect of mortality selection is imposed on the
evolution of cooperation and individuals’ fates are now
distinguished remarkably. Specially, in the extreme case
of β =∞, the individual with lowest payoff is selected to
be death definitely, which is somehow treated as determin-
istic process similar to that in ref. [22].
The coevolution dynamics of strategy and network
structure are performed by the procedure consisting of the
following stochastic death-birth process:
i) Fertility selection. An individual is selected for repro-
duction with its fertility probability. The offspring inherits
the strategy of its parent and links to its parent certainly.
Then, the offspring attaches to other k0− 1 nonparent
nodes randomly.
ii) Mortality selection. An individual is selected to die
out with its mortality probability and removed from the
network together with all its links.
Accordingly, the network is dynamically created and
evolved, and is not a preexisting space to be colonized but
an ever-changing web. This implies that local topological
properties, such as clustering coefficient [10], gradient and
topology potential [11], are not necessarily the mechanisms
for promoting cooperation. Therewith, owing to the global
selections of both mortality and fertility, cluster of both
strategists and cooperating k-core introduced in refs.
[34,38] can be employed to study the coevolution dynamics
of cooperation as well as global features of network.
In our simulation, the timescale is such that an average
number of N death and reproduction events occur in one
time step. At small β, 100 time steps are sufficient for the
system properties to reach the stationary state, including
cooperation density as well as network structure. The
stationary fraction of cooperators ρC and the properties
of network structure are determined by averaging over
1000 time steps after transients of 10000 time steps are
discarded. The results presented below are obtained from
ensemble averages over 100 independent simulations.
Results. –
Coevolution dynamics of the cooperation level. We
start by presenting results of the cooperation level ρC as
a function of the temptation b for various values of β as
shown in fig. 1(a). ρC always decreases monotonically with
increasing b for any β. At β = 0 as the case in [17], the
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Fig. 1: (Color online) (a) Density of the cooperators ρC in
dependence on temptation b at various values of mortality
selection intensity β. At b= 1.2, the system goes through a
continuous phase transition for β = 0 and a discontinuous phase
transition for β =∞, where the individual with lowest payoff
dies out definitely. At β = 1, the cooperation level is promoted
most for any b. For the simulation at the critical value of b for
each β, the system size ranges from 104 to 105. (b) Density
of cooperators ρC as a function of β with various values of
temptation b.




1, b < 1.2,
1
5(b− 1) , b > 1.2,
(1)
so the system goes through a continuous phase transition
from absorbing state (all cooperators) to coexistence at
b= 1.2 = 1+1/(〈k〉− 1), that is the network reciprocity in
agreement with Hamilton’s rule of kin selection. When β
is small, the weak mortality selection helps cooperators
to evolve under fertility selection. The low intensity of
mortality selection makes the cooperator hubs’ payoff
larger than the defector hubs’ one by eliminating the low-
payoff cooperators surrounding defector hubs, resulting
in more fertility of cooperator hubs than defector ones.
Thus, the cooperation level ρC is enhanced. Increasing β
up to about 1, ρC is enhanced most and the critical value
for continuous transition is also increased to b≈ 1.7. At
the same time, the dropping rate of ρC after critical b
increases with β due to its effect of payoff amplification in
the expression of mortality selection.
When β is larger than 1, mortality selection will be
the main effect on competition among the population.
Cooperators will self-organize into some special pattern
like cooperating k-core to survive as in the case in [34].
Although cooperators with higher payoff get more chance
to reproduce offsprings, their offsprings also need to get
high payoff to survive and then support parents survival
and reproduction further. Anyway, the results show that
higher intensity β of mortality selection exerts more
pressure on cooperators, resulting in lower cooperation
level ρC and critical b for transition. Payoff amplification
of β in mortality selection still steepens the dropping of
cooperation level vs. b.
At the extreme case of β =∞, there will be a discontin-
uous phase transition from all cooperators to all defectors
and the critical b is reduced back to 1.2 as in the case of
β = 0. Here, the individual with lowest payoff dies out defi-
nitely. At b < 1.2, fertility selection fixes cooperation even
with so strong mortality selection because of the network
reciprocity [17], without which the population falls into
whole defection for b > 1.2 (more details will be discussed
in the last section of results). In the latter condition, fertil-
ity selection is totally disregarded and mortality selection
has become the primary factor in the evolution.
We then investigate the dependence of the cooperation
level on the mortality selection intensity β as shown
in fig. 1(b). In agreement with the results shown in
fig. 1(a), ρC increases to maximum around β = 1, and
drops down as β gets too large for any value of b. From this
viewpoint, intermediate β coordinates with the fertility
selection for enhancing cooperation at most independently
of temptation b. Note that at b= 1.8, the cooperation level
ρC at β = 1 almost equals that at β = 1.26. We will focus
on the case of b= 1.8 and discuss the relationship between
cooperation evolution and network dynamics in the next
subsection.
Coevolution dynamics of network structure. The
information of the average degrees is important for
understanding the equilibrium value of ρC as a function
of β. Owing to the individual-based mortality selection,
the dynamics of average degrees are long-time correlated.
So we resort to the numerical simulation (fig. 2(a)), which
shows that intensity β exerts almost no influence over
the average degree of defectors 〈kD〉 while the one of
cooperators 〈kC〉 increases with β slowly up to β ≈ 1 and
then booms up. The reason lies in that defectors have
no payoff effect for their neighbors, while cooperators
have a great influence on the payoff of their neighbors
and significantly affect the mortality as well as fertility of
their neighbors. Another fact is that cooperators with few
neighbors are more likely to be eliminated. Especially in
the case with large β, every individual needs to struggle
to get links with cooperators for survival, which results
in a rapid increase of 〈kC〉. At the same time, the rapid
drop of the cooperation level ρC for large β leads 〈kC〉 to
grow further.
The correlation of these two populations is also required
to understand the evolution of cooperation. Let 〈kXY 〉
denote the average number of Y neighbors for X-player
and qX|Y the conditional probability to find an X-player
given that the adjacent node is occupied by a Y -player. At
β = 0 as the case in [17], 〈kCC〉 is equal to the mean-field
value 1+ (k0− 1)ρC and one link larger than 〈kCD〉
due to the very parent-offspring link (fig. 2(b)). So the
individuals are randomly connected. With increasing β,
48001-p3





























Fig. 2: (Color online) (a) The average degree of nodes 〈k〉,
cooperators 〈kC〉 and defectors 〈kD〉 vs. β, respectively. 〈kC〉
goes through a rapid rise for β ranging from 2 to 7, while 〈kD〉
almost keeps initial value 6. (b) 〈kCC〉 and 〈kCD〉 and their
difference vs. β. At β = 0, 〈kCC〉 is one larger than 〈kCD〉 due to
the very parent-offspring link. With increasing β, both 〈kCC〉
and 〈kCD〉 increase to maximum near β = 1. The line is the
mean-field value of 〈kCC〉 for random connection. (c) ρC vs. β
for the simulation and mean-field value using the data local
connection information shown in (a) and (b). The parameter
of the game is b= 1.8.
all individuals get closer to cooperators and both 〈kCC〉
and 〈kCD〉 increase up to maximum near β = 1, although
〈kC〉 grows more rapidly for β > 1. It means more and
more defectors get around cooperators. But cooperators
also struggle to get more cooperative neighbors to survive,
which leads 〈kCC〉 to be larger than the mean-field value.
The larger β is, the wider the difference grows. Anyway,
these information of local connections can be used to
infer the cooperation level ρC as a function of β for β < 1
pretty well as shown in fig. 2(c). Nonetheless, mortality
selection gradually differentiates individuals’ fate by
their payoffs even though they are the same strategists,
resulting in the larger and larger deviation of mean-field
prediction [17] from simulation (fig. 2(c)). For β > 1,
the cooperation level drops down to almost extinction,
while the mean field predicts that the cooperation level
maintains at a moderate value.
The global properties of the network structure, such
as cluster of nodes and strategists and cooperating
k-core [34], may shed some light on understanding the
cooperation level. The cluster of nodes is the connected
component of nodes and the cooperator cluster (CC) or
defector cluster (DC) is the connected component fully
occupied by cooperators or defectors, respectively. As β
































































Fig. 3: (Color online) (a) Numbers of CC, DC and node cluster
vs. β, respectively. With increasing β, the CC number and
cluster number decline to 1 simultaneously. (b) The average
size of CC, DC and cluster as a function of β, respectively.
(c) The cooperating k-core number vs. β. Although there is
more than one 1-cores (also CCs) at low β, there is only one
k-core with k > 1. Note that there is almost no cooperating
6-core at the system with k0 = 6. (d) The cooperating k-core
size vs. β. The size of the cooperating k-core with all k gets
to the maximum at β = 1.26. The parameter of the game is
b= 1.8.
and more cooperative neighbors, while cooperators
struggle for life by connecting together. Apparently, it
will be difficult for the isolated cooperators to survive
as well as to reproduce. Thus, cooperators assemble in a
cooperator cluster and defectors surround cooperators.
Increasing β induces the congestion of cooperators as
well as that of nodes clusters (fig. 3(a)). At the same
time, the sole CC alienates defectors and the DC number
increases gradually until β increases up to 1.26. It is
worth remarking that the mean-field analysis predicts
the simulation result of ρC relatively well in this range
of β (fig. 2(c)). For β > 1.26, the cooperation level ρC
begins to drop rapidly and then defectors get more
chance to link with each other, resulting in the decline of
the DC number and in the increase of the DC average
size (fig. 3(b)). On the other hand, fig. 3(c) shows us
that the cooperating k-core with larger k emerges at
larger β and disappears at smaller β. Cooperating k-core
describes the tight level of CC. Here, k0 = 6 limits the
tightest CC to be the cooperating 6-core. But in the case of
b= 1.8, just the cooperating 5-core exists at the range of β
from 0.8 to 3, where ρC increases to maximum and begins
to drop down. What makes sense is that cooperation level
is still promoted most at β = 1.26 where the cooperating
k-core size with k up to 5 gets to maximum as shown in
fig. 3(d). When β > 1.26, the payoff amplification effect
in mortality selection destabilizes the cooperating k-core
and causes its collapse.
The effects of mortality selection on the dynamics.
Interestingly, intensity β also makes sense in the dynamics.
There is a lot of noise in the evolution at low β. Figure 4(a)
shows that there is a large fluctuation of the cooperation
48001-p4
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Fig. 4: (Color online) (a) Typical temporal evolution of ρC
for b= 1.9 at β = 0.5, 1, 2 in one-time simulation. (b) The
transient evolution of ρC (black line) and the size of the
cooperating 5-core (red line) with various values of β =
[1.26, 1.59, 2.0, 2.51, 3.16, 10], corresponding lines from top to
bottom. The larger β is, the more rapidly both ρC and cooper-
ating 5-core size increase in the beginning, the earlier they get
to vertexes and the lower cooperation level the system will be
stabled at. The parameter of the game is b= 1.8.
level ρC , but the system reaches the steady state quickly
and gets the highest cooperation level at β = 1. With
increasing β, the process becomes more and more deter-
minate but the steady state needs more and more time to
reach. We further analyze the average dynamical processes
at various β as shown in fig. 4. When the cooperating
5-core emerges, a large β will hamper cooperators outside
the cooperating 5-core to survive, and only cooperators
in the cooperating 5-core could struggle for life. At this
condition, cooperators gain more payoffs than defectors by
forming a cooperating 5-core and there are a few coopera-
tors outside this core. This process enhances cooperation
at the beginning. After the cooperation level arrives at
the vertex, defector’s reproduction capacity will surpass
its mortality and cooperators will be selected out to die
with more probability. If one of the cooperators in this
5-core dies out, the cooperating 5-core will collapse down
in a cascading way. At moderate selection intensity β =
1.26, the system is stable at the maximal level after it
reaches the vertex. Once the selection intensity β exceeds
1.26, the cooperating 5-core goes through a little collapse,
which decreases the cooperation level ρC . Thus, for any
intensity β > 1.26, both ρC and the cooperating 5-core
size increase rapidly to a lower vertex and then they both
go through a transient time of prompt decreasing. What
is more, increasing β prolongs the dropping time and
leads the system to a lower cooperation level. Importantly,
increasing β disrupts the cooperating 5-core rapidly, which
results in a rapid drop of ρC , although there are some
cooperators surviving outside the cooperating 5-core.
In the extreme case of β =∞ as shown in fig. 5(a), ρC
shows a power-law decay vs. time. Note that the values
shown in fig. 1(a) for large β with b > 1.2 are the transient
cooperation density not the equilibrium ones. The system
may go into the absorbing state without any cooperator,


























Fig. 5: (Color online) (a) Temporal evolution of ρC for β =∞
at various b. The cooperation density shows a power-law decay
at b > 1.2. (b) The power-law decay of the cooperation density
at β =∞ and b= 1.8 is independent of the system size.
but the process needs enormous time which is unreachable
now. If so, this discontinuous phase transition from all
cooperators to all defectors corresponds to the classic
PD game with normalized sucker’s payoff S = 1− b on
dynamical network without mortality selection [17], which
is in consistency with the simple rule 〈k〉< b/(b− 1) for
network reciprocity [15]. Thus, mortality selection with
infinite intensity transforms the payoff matrix [27] by
changing S from 0 to 1− b. Notice that here 〈k〉 evolves
with network dynamics as shown in fig. 2(a) and 〈k〉
is replaced by the initial value k0 in the simple rule of
network reciprocity.
What is more, the power-law decay of the cooperation
level (fig. 5(a)) implies that the mean extinction time
T has a power-law dependence on the system size N ,
T ∼Nγ . Due to the unreachable time cost for extinc-
tion time, we plotted the dynamics of ρC with various
system size as shown in fig. 5(b). Excluding the finite-
size effect, the dynamics are nearly the same for differ-
ent system size. In the case of b= 1.8, ρC ∝ tα with
α=−0.3. When the system is going into extinction of
cooperators, ρC = 1/N at t= T . Thus the mean extinc-
tion time T is proportional to a power-law function
of the system size, like T ∝N−1/α =Nγ . This process
corresponds to the so-called neutral evolution apart from
Darwinian evolution [35,36,39]. Neutral evolution signals
dominant influences of stochastic effects that occur from
the unavoidable stochasticity of death and birth events
and the finiteness of populations. In our case, β =∞ mini-
mizes the stochastic effect of the death event, but leads
the evolution to the neutral regime. We argue that the
space viscousness may play an important role in this
abnormal result. Anyway, as for the dynamics, this dis-
continuous phase transition is distinct from the classic PD
game without mortality selection in [17].
Summary. – Here we propose a very simple coevo-
lution model of cooperation evolution with network
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dynamics composed of mortality and fertility selections.
Our study shows that the cooperation level ρC goes
through a continuous phase transition vs. b for finite β
and a discontinuous one for infinite β. The cooperation
level is enhanced most at β ≈ 1 for any temptation
b. Connectivity and global properties of the network
structure such as clusters and cooperating k-core have
been investigated for understanding the cooperation level
ρC as a function of β. As β increases to the optimal
cooperation level, all cooperators gather together to form
a cooperator cluster and all defectors surround this cluster
to form a node cluster of the whole population. After that,
increasing β tights the cooperator cluster to promote
the cooperation level and gives rise to a cooperating
k-core with larger and larger k. However, too large β
destroys the cooperating k-core rapidly which results in
a rapid drop of ρC and invalids the mean-field prediction
completely after ρC rises to the maximum. The critical
value of b at β =∞ is the same as that in the case β = 0,
whose transition corresponds to the classic PD game
with normalized sucker’s payoff S = 1− b on a dynamical
network without mortality selection [17]. This result
indicates that infinite mortality selection can transform
the payoff matrix such as parameter S by changing from
0 to 1− b. What is more, the dynamics of ρC undergoes
a power-law decay, which is considered as the so-called
neutral selection usually induced by large stochasticity
of basic events of death and birth and the finiteness of
population.
In future work, we will devote to the description of
the collapse dynamics of the cooperating k-core and
exploration of the mechanisms to preserve the cooperating
k-core. More importantly, our simple coevolution model
may pave the way for future studies in this field by
being extended. For example, including the inheritance of
successful relationships of parent’s neighbors as well as a
strategy will promote the cooperation level further.
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[22] Wang W.-X., Lü J., Chen G. and Hui P. M., Phys.
Rev. E, 77 (2008) 046109.
[23] Szolnoki A., Perc M., Szabó G. and Stark H.-U.,
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